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DCS1N 



COE 


OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 

(OE) 


A composite of the conditions, 
circumstances, and influences 
that affect the employment of 
military forces and bear on 
the decisions of the unit 
commander. (JP 1-02) 


CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT (COE) 


The OE that exists in the 
world today and is expected 
to exist in the clearly 
foreseeable future. 


DCS1N 


THE CSA SPEAKS 


"Today, our Nation is at war and we are a 
critical part of the joint team— an Army at 
war. This is not a new war. Our enemies 
have been waging it for some time, and it will 
continue for the foreseeable future. As the 
President has stated. This is a different kind 
of war against a different kind of enemy.* It 
is a war we must win, a war for our very way 
of life. 

"War is both a physical reality and a state 
of mind. War is ambiguous, uncertain, and 
unfair. When we are at war, we must think 
and act differently. We become more flexible 
and more adaptable. We must anticipate the 
ultimate reality check — combat. We must 



CM?”- three-block 

"In one moment in tk/WAR service members 
will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees— 
providing humanitarian assistance. In the next 
moment, they will be holding two warring tribes 
apart— conducting peacekeeping operations. 
Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid- 
intensity battle. All on the same day, all within 
three city blocks. It will be what we call the 
three-block war." 


HOW OTHERS PERCEIVE 
THE U.S. AND THE WEST 



"We made it clear to the world that we will 
not let America's new world order work .... 
But the Americans are afraid of death. They 
are like little mice. If Russia can be 
destroyed, the United States can also be 
beheaded." 

Osama Bin Laden, Interview, 18 March 1997 

"War has rules, but those rules are set by 
the West ... if you use those rules, then 
weak countries have no chance .... We are 
a weak country, so do we need to fight 
according to your rules? No." 


Col Wang Xiangsui, Chinese Air Force, as quoted in the 
Washington Post . 9 Aug 1999 


COE PREMISES 

No peer competitor until 2020 or 
beyond. 

Nations will continue to field armed 
forces. 

- Their actions may cause US 
intervention. 

- Develop diplomatic and military 
plans to deal with US intervention. 

- Modernize armed forces within 
economic constraints. 


Non-state actors in any regional conflict. 


CRITICAL VARIABLES IN THE COE 


Any OE, in the Real World or in the Training 

Environment, Can Be Defined in Terms of 11 

Critical Variables: 

- Physical 

environment. 


-Technology. 

-Information. 


- Nature and stability 
of the state. 

- Sociological 
demographics. 


-External 

organizations. 

-National will. 


- Regional and global 
relationships. 


-Time. 

-Economics. 


- Military capabilities. 


DCSIN 


PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 

9 Terrain and weather. 

9 Military forces are optimized 
for certain environments. 

9 Less complex and open 
environments favor the US. 

9 Enemies will try to use urban 
environments and other 
complex terrain to their 
advantage. 






NATURE AND STABILITY 
OF THE STATE 


How strong or how shaky. 

Where the real strength is. 

Who is in charge. 

Nature and aims of military 
campaign. 


Kinds of threats present. 


NATURE AND STABILITY 
OF THE STATE 

Regional power with strong government. 
Support by populace. 

Pockets of dissidence. 

Failing state— ungovernable. 

Other than legitimate government. 
Outside support. 


SOCIOLOGICAL DEMOGRAPHICS 


* Cultural, religious, ethnic. 

* Extreme devotion to a cause. 

* Sympathetic to enemy cause. 

* Refugees and displaced 
persons. 

* Urban environments (cities). 


REGIONAL AND GLOBAL 
RELATIONSHIPS 


AIILilli^e^and coalitions. 

f \s. 

vjn. r? - 

Political, economic, military, or cultural. 








Opponents can influence our coalitions 

aTJA, [ YtN/v?, 

Add to military capability and broaden 
scale of military operations. 






Unpredictability. 

| J 

Nonaligned states. 



MILITARY CAPABILITIES 


The most critical and most complex factor. 
Interacts with other variables. 

Measured in relative terms. 

Conventional against local or regional actors. 

Adaptive (asymmetric) approaches against US. 

- US as major power (superpower). 

- US has overall technological advantage. 

- Others use this as a guide to optimizing their 
own capabilities and negating ours. 


TECHNOLOGY 


What nations and others can — 

- Develop and Produce. 

- Purchase and Import. 

Available on the global market. 

Eroding US technological 
advantage. 


INFORMATION 


* Information-based society and information technology. 


- Computers. 

- Other information systems. 

- Civilian and military sectors. 

* Information warfare. 

- Computer warfare. 

- Information attack. 

- Psychological warfare. 

- Deception. 



7 



IN 


INFORMATION (Cont) 


Media and global information flow. 

- Transparency (access to data). 

- Publicize US mistakes and 
failures. 

- Sway public and political opini< 


Situational awareness. 

- Home field advantage. 

- Commercial systems. 

- Human networks. 





EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS 


International humanitarian relief. 

- Manmade and natural disasters. 

- Disease, hunger, and poverty. 



International media. 
Transnational corporations. 


EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS 

(Cont) 


Growing in influence and power. 

Willingness to become involved in crisis 
situations. 

Stated and hidden interests/objectives. 

- Favorable to US and provide assistance. 

- Adverse to US or create conflict. 

- Make mistakes. 


NATIONAL WILL 


People, government, and military. 

Objectives and duration of a conflict. 

Victory often depends on will. 

Attack the opponent's national will 
and try to preserve your own. 

US national will as a vulnerability— a 
strategic center of gravity. 


TIME 


Time drives decision making 
and operations. 

Opponents see time as being 
in their advantage. 

- Adjust the nature of the 
conflict. 

-Prepare for adaptive 
operations. 

-Dictate the tempo. 

-Seize opportunities. 


ECONOMICS 


"Haves" and "have-nots." 

Economic differences can cause conflicts. 

Economic vs military superiority. 

Ability to buy military technology or to 
conduct prolonged operations. 

Regional and global economic relationships 
can result in military or political 
assistance. 



CRITICAL VARIABLES IN THE COE 



Any OE, in the Real World or in the Training 
Environment, Can Be Defined in Terms of 11 

Critical Variables 



COE PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK 

* To understand and analyze the complex and 
ever-changing combination of conditions, 
circumstances, and influences that affect real- 
world military operations. 

* To ensure that training environments represent 
the degree of unpredictability and complexity 
present in real-world OEs in a manner that 
sufficiently challenges the training audiences. 



ACTORS 



Nation-states: 

* Core 

* Transition 

* Rogue 

* Failed or Failing 

Non-state actors: 

* Rogue actors: * Third-party actors: 


- Insurgent. 

- Terrorist. 

- Drug- 
trafficking. 

- Criminal. 


- Humanitarian relief 
organizations. 

- Refugees/IDPs. 

- Media. 

- Transnational 
corporations 


- Other civilians on 
the battlefield. 


ENEMY 


The individual, group of 

individuals (organized or not 

organized), paramilitary or 

military force, national 

entity, or national alliance 

that is in opposition to the 

United States, its allies, or 

multinational partners. (FM 
IN adversary or 

opponent. 


THREAT 

(Potential Adversary) 

Any specific foreign nation or 
organization with intentions and 
military capabilities that 
suggest it could become an 
adversary or challenge the 
national security interests of 
the United States or its allies. 

(AR 350-2, Opposing Force Program) 


COLD WAR OPFOR 


Opposing Force (OPFOR) 

An organized force created by 
and from U.S. army units to 
portray a unit of a potential 
adversary armed force. 


AR 350-2 (1976) 



HOW THE WORLD HAS EVOLVED 



CNf“- FY 04 TRADOC 

COMMAND TRAINING GUIDANCE 

"FY 03 saw us making significant strides 
in divesting ourselves of Cold War tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTP) in our 
training and education and at our combat 
training centers (CTCs), In FY 04, we must 
complete that divestment and fully 
implement full-spectrum operations in the 
contemporary operational environment (COE) 
at our CTCs and in our classrooms." 

"Make this the year we unequivocally 
divest ourselves of Cold War doctrine, 
scenarios, threat, opposing force (OPFOR), 
and operational environment; and 
completely embrace the COE. 11 


OPPOSING FORCE (OPFOR) 

fhat kind of OPFOR is needed to train for COE 

* Military and/or paramilitary 
forces. 

* Nation-state and/or non-state. 

* Challenging and non-cooperative 

sparring partner. 

* Has strengths and weaknesses. 

* Thinks and acts differently. 


CONTEMPORARY 
OPPOSING FORCE (OPFOR) 


A plausible, flexible military 
and/or paramilitary force 
representing a composite of 
varying capabilities of actual 
worldwide forces, used in 
lieu of a specific threat force, 
for training and developing 
US forces. 


OPFOR IN A BROADER SENSE 


* Military Forces 

* Paramilitary Forces 

* Other Instruments of 
Power 

- Diplomatic-Political 

- Informational 

- Economic 

* Allied Forces 


Affiliated Forces 



STRATEGIC OPERATIONS 

Universal Strategy for All Situations 
Against 

- All Kinds of Opponents 

- Potential Opponents 

- Neutral Parties 

Target Enemy's Strategic Centers of 
Gravity 

- Soldiers' and Leaders' Confidence 

- Political and Diplomatic Decisions 

- Public Opinion 

- Interests of Private Institutions 

- National Will 
-Alliances and Coalitions 


STRATEGIC OPERATIONS 

•ATr Means Available 

- Diplomatic Initiatives 

- Information Warfare 

- Economic Pressure 

- Terrorist Attacks 

- State-Sponsored 
Insurgency 

- Direct Action by SPF 

- Deep-Strike Precision Fires 

- WMD 

• Place Noncombatants at 
Risk 

* No Sanctuary 


• Mnf I imifaH fn \A/ai4im 


STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 


Peace 

4 4 - 




Post-War 

► ► 


STRATEGIC OPERATIONS 


Against Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity 


REGIONAL 



US ENTRY 



OPERATIONS 


4 TRANSITION ^ 
OPERATIONS 


Against 
Regional 
Opponents the 
State 

Overmatches 


ADAPTIVE 

OPERATIONS 


Wartime 

On l y 


Against Extraregional 
Opponents that 
Overmatch 
the State 


► 


4 


FOREIGN VIEWS OF THE US 


Major power with overall 
technological advantage. 

Prefer standoff combat. 

Depend on high 
technology. 

Depend on information 
dominance. 

Conduct predictable 
military operations. 





FOREIGN VIEWS OF THE US 

(Cont) 

* Unwilling to accept 
heavy losses. 

* Sensitive to domesti 
and world opinion. 

* Lack of commitment 
over time. 


* Lack of cultural 
awareness. 




FOREIGN VIEWS OF THE US 

(Cont). 

* Vulnerability of coalitions. 

* Vulnerability of force projection. 

* Depend on 
robust 
logistics. 

* Rely on 
contractor 
support. 

* Stretched 

■ I ■ ^ ^ M 




DCSIN 


ADAPTIVE PRINCIPLES 

FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST EXTRAREGIONAL 

POWER 

* Control access to the region. 

* Change the nature of the con 

* Employ operational shieldin 

* Control tempo. 

* Neutralize technological over 

* Cause politically unacceptable casualties. 



Allow no sanctuary. 


PARAMILITARY AND 
NONMILITARY 


Paramilitary 

Regular 

Internal Security Forces 

Government 

Irregular 

Insurgents 


Terrorists 

Large-Scale Drug and Criminal Organizations 

Private Security Organizations 



Transnational Corporations 

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or 

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c 

International Humanitarian Relief Organizations 

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Media 


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Drug and Criminal Elements 




Other Civilians on the Battiefield (COBs) 



SUMMARY 


Baseline Doctrine for Contemporary 
OPFOR 

- Applicable to Entire Training Community 

- Allows Scenario Writers Flexibility 

Total Operational Environment 

- All Eleven Variables of the COE 

- All Instruments of Power 

- Adaptive Use of All Available 
Capabilities 

- To Fight and Win Against the US 


SUMMARY 


Less Predictable OPFOR 

- Difficult to Template 

- Adapts to Different Situations 

Flexible, Thinking, Adaptive OPFOR 

- Initiative and Judgment 

- Lessons Learned 

OPFOR Doctrinal Framework 

- Will Meet Most Training Requirements 

- Will Continue to Evolve 


OPFOR 


PILLARS OF COE 
IMPLESlEi 


Jo 




^ 0 oal E nvir 0n 




"A composite of the 
conditions, 
circumstances, and 
influences that affect 
employment of military 
forces and bear on the 
decisions of the unit 
commander." (JP 1-02) 


E Variables 



DCSIN 


COE - THE TRAINING 
"CONDITION" 


TASK 


Mission 

Essential 

Tasks 

(From Army 
Universal 
Task List) 


CONDITION 

Contemporary 
Operational 
Environment 
(Live or 
Simulated) 


STANDARD 

Desired 

Training 

Outcome 

s 



COE IN THE TRAINING 
ENVIRONMENT 

COE variables are manifested in scenarios, 
curriculum, and POIs in a fashion sufficient to 

- Provide realistic conditions and challenges. 

- Produce desired training outcomes and leader 
development goals. 

An OPFOR that— 

- Is equipped and organized according to a TRADOC 
DCSINT-approved OB. 

- Operates according to FM 7-100 doctrinal manuals. 


OPFOR FIELD MANUALS 

• FM 7-100 OPFOR Doctrinal Framework and 
Strategy 


• FM 7-100.1 OPFOR Operations 

• FM 7-100.2 OPFOR Tactics 

• FM 7-100.3 OPFOR: Paramilitary and 

Nonmilitary Organizations and 

Tactics 

•FM 7-100.4 OPFOR Small Unit Tactics 

• FM 7-100.5 OPFOR Organization Guide 

T ^9-i66.% on AK0 


ARMY KNOWLEDGE 
COLLABORATION CENTER 

Army KCC Home 
Army Communities 
£5 TRADOC 
ai DCSINT 

Q ADCSINT-FUTURES 
a ADCSINT-Threats 
Q 100.3 TSP 

a Assessing the OE of Iraq 
Q COE Admin Force Structure 
Q FM 7-100 Series 
Q ST7-100BattleBook for COE 
Q TTT 
Q Terrorism 

Q World Wide Equipment 


Questions? 


TRADOC ADCSINT-Threats Collaboration Center on AKO